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I. Introduction
In theory the notion of the burden of proof is fairly simple: to conclude on whether an argument has been established, the judge must examine who has to prove it. Nevertheless, the simplicity of this question downplays the difficulty of the issue, that is, how to properly allocate the burden of proof. The latter is not just yet another evidence rule. On the contrary, how the burden of proof is distributed between the parties affects the enforcement of the substantive provisions and reflects policy choices, efficiency considerations and fairness concerns, which are prone to critically affect the outcome of litigation. Article 101(1) TFEU reads as follows: 'The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market (…)'. However, according to Article 101(3) TFEU, 'The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question'. In the present article, the word 'agreement' must be understood as referring to decisions or concerted practices as well. Similarly the term 'restriction of competition' must be understood as also encompassing the distortion or prevention thereof. As will be demonstrated, the shared apportionment of the burden of persuasion between the Commission and the undertakings is at odds with both the legal test that outlines the scope of Article 101 TFEU and the presumption of innocence. More specifically, it is submitted that the current allocation of the legal burden is prone to confuse the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, whereas it may also impair the effective judicial protection of the undertakings who find themselves involved in infringement proceedings, insofar as the presumption of innocence does apply thereto.
For the purposes of the analysis, the article is structured as follows. Firstly, section II offers a short account of the precise meaning and function of the burden of proof, highlighting its forms and significance in the decision-making process. Then, section III briefly reviews the case-law of the EU Courts 3 in order to verify that their understanding of the way the burden of 
II. The Concept of the Burden of Proof and its Significance
Ascertaining the facts of the case is an essential precondition for applying the pertinent rules in adjudication. However, absolute factual certainty is hardly ever attainable. As a result, judges are often forced to make decisions under circumstances of incomplete information. Since they cannot simply refuse to adjudicate and are obliged to decide one way or the other, 4 the question that emerges is how to proceed when no conclusion on the facts of the case can be reached. In this scenario one of the litigants must inevitably bear the risk of an erroneous ruling. 5 Helpfully, evidence law comes to our rescue by providing mechanisms that allocate this risk between the parties and offer a way out of the deadlock. 6 Such an example is the burden of proof that indicates who will be forced by law to take the risk of a mistaken ruling in case of a fact-finding failure.
Nevertheless, the question remains how the burden of proof should be allocated. 7 The conventional answer to this is that ei incumbit probatio qui dicit non qui negat. 8 In other words, the starting point for the allocation of the burden of proof is that 'he or she who asserts a fact must prove it', irrespective of his or her procedural capacity as claimant or defendant. 9 However, fairness, proportionality and efficiency considerations may play a determinative role in adjusting the apportionment of the burden of proof. Indeed, from a fairness perspective the division of the burden of proof must be aligned with the presumption of innocence, where the latter applies.
Moreover, the allocation of the burden of proof is subject to the general principle of proportionality, in the sense that none of the parties should be forced to prove 'something that cannot be proved or something which can be proved only with the utmost difficulty', as this would amount to a probatio diabolica. 10 Last but not least, it is often stressed that from an efficiency point of view the burden of proof should rest on the party who is better equipped to satisfy it, the idea being that the person with the better information should be forced to bring it forward. That said, a few clarifications are in order. First of all, the burden of proof has a two-fold essence: the burden of persuasion (or legal burden) and the burden of adducing evidence (or evidential burden). 11 Usually, the legislature does not explicitly distinguish between the two dimensions of the burden of proof. Nevertheless, being aware of its two-fold nature is of crucial practical significance for the following reasons. Firstly, contrary to the burden of persuasion, which remains stable and rests upon a specific party throughout the proceedings, the evidential burden may shift to and fro the litigants several times. 12 Secondly, what truly matters at the end of litigation is who bears the legal burden of proof, as this party will essentially bear the risk of non-persuasion. 13 Equally important is not to mistake the legal burden of proof with the substantive legal test. While the latter delineates what type of conduct comes within the ambit of the substantive rules, the former indicates who should bear the burden of demonstrating so.
Finally, the question of the allocation of the burden of proof should not be confused with the distinct matter of its discharge. Indeed, the distribution of the burden of proof addresses the issue of 'who should bear it', whereas the question of its discharge pertains to how the person carrying the burden of proof may satisfy it. The short answer to this is by providing evidence to the applicable standard of proof. 14 In practice, however, discharging the burden of proof will be 11 The burden of persuasion must not be confused with the burden of production. While the latter answers the question 'who must produce evidence in relation to an issue', the burden of persuasion solves the following problem: 'if there is uncertainty as to whether the standard of proof has been satisfied, who will lose the case?'. J Thayer, ' This twofold division of the legal burden is not compromised by the fact that -as explained previously -the evidential burden may shift to and fro the Commission and the undertakings several times throughout the proceedings. 18 As Advocate General ('AG') Kokott observed in her Opinion in T-Mobile Netherlands, such shift constitutes 'the normal operation of the respective burdens of adducing evidence'. 19 Indeed, the party who bears the burden of persuasion also bears the initial burden of adducing evidence. 20 However, the ECJ rightly explained in Aalborg Portland that irrespective of how the legal burden is distributed, 'the factual evidence on which a party relies may be of such a kind as to require the other party to provide an explanation or justification, failing which it is permissible to conclude that the burden of proof has been discharged'. 21 In practice, this means that an undertaking cannot simply contest the Commission's findings but must produce counter-evidence capable of discrediting them. 22 As AG Kokott clarified in her Opinion in FEG, it falls on the undertaking 'to show in detail why the information used by the Commission is inaccurate, why it has no probative value, if that is the case, or why the conclusions drawn by the Commission are unsound'. 23 Nevertheless, discharge of the burden of production by the party other than the one bearing the legal burden of proof does not require establishing a positive case. 24 All it requires is that the undertaking 'calls into question' -rather than disproves -the Commission's arguments. 27 Thus, where Article 101(3) TFEU is invoked, both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production fall upon the defendant undertakings who seek to benefit from its application.
As the above brief account suggests, the EU Courts' understanding of the allocation of Secondly, understood as signifying that the Commission is entitled to confine its analysis to a consideration of the restrictive aspects of the conduct only and that efficiencies are for the undertakings to demonstrate, the current bifurcated allocation of the legal burden of proof implies that the procompetitive aspects of the agreement or concerted practice may not be ever accounted for. In the same vein, reducing the Commission's legal burden to an obligation to merely establish the anticompetitive nature or effects of the conduct in question is prone to pave the way for an expansive construction of the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU and increase the risk of over-enforcement. This risk will not be as high where there is broad consensus in economic theory that the conduct at hand rarely generates efficiencies, such as is, for instance, the case with cartels. 40 Nevertheless, the danger of over-enforcement will be more than present in the case of agreements or concerted practices with a good deal of both anticompetitive and Nothing in this formulation supports the conclusion that it should be for the defendant undertakings to prove any efficiencies flowing from their agreement or concerted practice. 42 At any rate, the current allocation of the legal burden in 
B. Placing the Legal Burden of Proving Article 101(3) TFEU on the Undertakings Is At

Odds with the Presumption of Innocence
In any event, even on the assumption that the allocation of the burden of persuasion envisaged protection. 51 Unsurprisingly, the question whether competition enforcement has become 'criminal' in nature has generated much debate in the wake of the Commission's practice to impose higher and higher penalties for violations of the competition rules. For the purposes of the present article, however, the applicability of the presumption of innocence to infringement proceedings will be taken for granted and will not be challenged. On this basis, the following paragraphs will consider whether a shared division of the legal burden to the effect that the Commission must demonstrate the existence of an infringement under Article 101(1) TFEU, whereas the undertakings must prove the elements of Article 101(3) TFEU, adheres to the principle that 'every person should be considered to be innocence, unless proven guilty'.
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To answer this question, it is necessary to recall the evidential implications of the presumption of innocence as traditionally understood. Indeed, three fundamental prescriptions stem from it: firstly, no-one can be forced to prove his innocence; secondly, any doubt as to the guilt of the defendant must operate in his benefit; and thirdly, the defendant may be exceptionally burdened with proving the elements of a defence only if the standard of proof that he must satisfy is the lowest one, that is, the balance of probabilities. Rather surprisingly, this question has troubled the EU Courts only exceptionally. is therefore not sufficient … to adduce evidence that merely gives rise to uncertainty' as to the application of that provision. 66 Evaluating these issues on appeal, the ECJ took the view that the complaint was essentially a repetition of the arguments put before the General Court seeking reexamination of its assessment and ultimately dismissed the plea as inadmissible.
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Regrettably, the MasterCard judgments leave us none the wiser about the standard of proof that defendant undertakings must satisfy in order to discharge their burden of persuasion under Article 101(3) TFEU. The General Court's judgment could be interpreted to suggest that this is higher than the balance of probabilities. In this case the current bifurcated allocation of the legal burden of proof would be incompatible with the presumption of innocence. Even so, however, one should not rush to conclusions. In theory, such incompatibility could be rectified simply by reducing the undertakings' legal burden under Article 101(3) TFEU to an obligation to demonstrate the conditions of this provision to a balance of probabilities threshold only. 64 MasterCard II (n 44), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para 141. 65 ibid. 66 ibid, paras 146-147. 67 MasterCard II (n 44), paras 215-219.
Therefore, it is necessary to inquire whether a civil standard of proof is feasible in the first place.
This presupposes deliberating over the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU and the standard of proof that the Commission must satisfy in order to discharge its burden of proof under Article 101(1) TFEU.
As described earlier in passing, Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 prescribes that when seeking to benefit from Article 101(3) TFEU the defendant undertakings bear the legal burden of demonstrating all the four requirements of this provision. Accordingly, it falls upon them to establish not only that the conduct in question gives rise to efficiencies, but also that it allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits. As the Commission has elaborated in its
Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU, the latter condition 'implies in general that efficiencies generated by the restrictive agreement within a relevant market must be sufficient to outweigh the anti-competitive effects produced by the agreement within that same relevant market'. 68 In other words, the alleged efficiencies must offset the anticompetitive effects ECR II-1333, para 64, the General Court explicitly rejected the assertion that 'the Commission must adduce proof "beyond any reasonable doubt" of the existence of the infringement in cases where it imposes heavy fines'. Schweitzer commented that the rejection of the criminal dispute that 'firm conviction' is a considerably higher standard of proof than the mere preponderance of the evidence. 72 The implications of this should not be underestimated. Indeed, if the Commission has discharged its burden of proof by producing evidence which supports the firm conviction that the agreement or concerted practice gives rise to anticompetitive effects, then defendant undertakings entertain no real prospect of having their defence upheld, unless they establish an at least equally strong conviction that their conduct gives rise to efficiencies that offset these anticompetitive effects.
To some extent, this point was incidentally made by AG Trstenjak in her Opinion in GSK Services. Pondering on the standard of proof that must be satisfied for an appreciable objective advantage to be found, she remarked that 'a high degree of probability must be set here. That is because, with infringements of Article 81(1) EC [now Article 101(1) TFEU], the existence of losses in efficiency in the form of a restriction of competition must already be postulated'. 73 The consequence of this is that insofar as the Commission is subject to a threshold of persuasion which is higher than the balance of probabilities, satisfying the civil standard of proof will never suffice for undertakings to successfully invoke the defence of Article 101(3)
TFEU. In fact, the undertakings' standard of proof will always mirror the threshold of persuasion that the Commission itself must surpass. Because the latter is (rightly) higher than a mere preponderance of the evidence, the bifurcated allocation of the legal burden of proof as innocence. 74 On this ground, it is submitted that the whole legal burden should be placed on the Commission.
V. The Way Forward: Re-Reading Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003
As the analysis so far demonstrated, despite its intuitive appeal, the shared allocation of the legal burden of proof has significant repercussions both for the application of the substantive legal test of Article 101 TFEU and the effective judicial protection of the undertakings concerned. For these repercussions to be effectively addressed, the legal burden must be borne by the 74 This is especially so, if one recalls that it is the Commission that weighs up the advantages and disadvantages that entail from the investigated agreement or concerted practice and that in so doing it enjoys a margin of appreciation. On the contrary, the defendant undertakings obviously enjoy no discretion in attempting to discharge their legal 
